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Introduction
For the past ten years I have been employed more or less full time
as an 'independent' evaluator of educational programmes in Britain,
mostly programmes of new curriculum development, mostly concerned
with secondary schools :In England and Wales, mostly sponsored by
government or seni-govanment agencies.
During this period, a decade in which evaluation has evolved from
a minor to a major branch of applied educational research, I have
benefitted enormously from contacts with research communities out-
side Britain, and I wane to say how warmly I welcome this opportunity
to exchange views and experiences with Canadian educators.
Evaluation, like other fields of enquiry, is beset by a number of
persistent dilemmas, sone technical, some ethical, and some, I
would suggest, politica:.. Unless we can, and soon, solve the
fundamental issues raised by the now widespread acknowledgement
that evaluation is a significant from of political action, then
I doubt very much whether the kind of activity in which I and many
others throughout the Western hemisphere are presently engaged can
survive as a defenslbLe social role.
My therm for this presentation has the rather grandiose title of
'Democracy and Evaluation'. I should, and do, apologise for that,
but only because it promises more.:than I can deliver... We have
reached a point in the development of social policy evaluation
Anublic address at the University of Alberta Faculty of Education,
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where consciousness of evaluation as a political activity, one
which influences the distribution of goods and opportunities in
our societies, has never been higher. And I want to take this
oppoi7tunity to confront, as directly as I may and as crudely as
must, the problem of the political stance of the evaluation
specialist in the liberal democratic state. My emphasis, one
which reflects my own work experience, is upon the evaluation of
major programmes of educational innovation. This may not match
too well the interests or opportunities that most of you have in
evaluation, but I believe that the main issues are important to
all of us, and have implications for the design of evaluations
at any level.
First an anecdote which encapsulates some of my anxieties about
contemporary evaluation trends. Last week I met a man who was
just about to resign his job as a civil servant in the Brussels-
based bureaucracy of the European Economic Community. In this job
he had help to launch a Community-wide programme for the socially
disadvantagal, and now he was leaving to set up a private agency
to evaluate the programme under contract to the . EEC. He hoped
to expand the agency through further EEC evaluation contracts in
the future, asd to locate it in a European university with which
he was presently negotiating terms. In return for facilities
and some as yet undetermined form of associate academic status
he was prepared to offer the university forty per cent overheads
on the contract, Nice man, quite open and enthusiastic about
the enterprise. And why not? The path he has chosen is already
becoming well-tr,Iden, and he did not share my concerns about the
political significance of this particular form of entrepreneurial
opportunism. TheSe concerns will I hope become clear in what
follows.
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A Portrayal of the Liberal Democratic Evaluator
Let me begin with a broad and inescapably crude sketch of how we
evaluators might see our political role within the contemporary
liberal democratic state. when our children grow old enough (or
are still young enough) to ask us how we help to create a better
society for them and their friends, don't we reply more or loss
like this. We work in the welfare sector of managed. states,
helping to bring about a more equitable distribution of social
goods by improving the basis of public decisions on social action
programmes. It makes little difference whether we live in basically
capitalist or basically socialist democracies, in America or Britain.
Both are pretty mixed anyway, cnd both have a growing commitment on
the part of elected governments to reducing the gap between the
haves' and the have nets'. We would concede that reducing this
gap is no small problem, aS its persistence testifies, but speaking
as 'liberals' (and one of our colleagues, ErneSt Sense (1976)
has recently pointed out that we are all political liberals despite
the various ways we define and prosecute evaluation) we believe
that a key element in the alleviation of social ills is informed
executive and legislative action. Sustained by this belief we
open more and more public windows on the private world of
educational practice, documenting the impact of the latest policies
and programms, drawing attention to malfunctions, unconsidered
phenomena, occasional promise. Better information, we say, makes
possible mo:e effective discharge of public responsibilities.
Mind you w& re not completely naive. Modern democracies confer,
even if temporarily, enormous power on their authorised agents,
and we recNnise that power generates its own agenda. Most of us
work, directly or indirectly, for powerful office-holders, and we
know that the kind of information we produce can be used to sustain,
extend or :ustify power In ways which have nothing to do with or
are even in:ionsistent with the creation of a just society. We ]now
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that, and we sr:], consclo:2 ,2 of the nee‹: to =7::_tfin
against such possible abuses. We wouldn't work for private
individuals, for instance, because the public accountability of
those to whom we deliver oar reports is a most important condition
of the service we offer. Fortunately most of us evaluators are
members of academies; we work as contractors, not employees, of
those we inform, and the independence this gives us constitutes
a form of latent countervailing power in the event of gross knavery
or patmt folly on the part of the people's representatives or
their servants. This power is not, except in the strictest political
sense, illegitimate. It is part of the essential social meaning of
the University that it safeguards. a source of disinterested
critique, and this is partly why universities enjoy an unusual
degree of autonomy and security. But let us not be doubly naive
either. Academic independence is limited by dependence on state
support - we aoademics have no capital, and must trade with our
societies to survive. As for our power to intervene it is
difficult to see how we can exercise this more than sparingly
without generating in ourselves the very power syndrome we would
seek to restrain in others. We too are agents.
But'even this partial and qualified independence is sufficient
to enable us to fulfill an acceptable and justifiable socio-
political role. Because our academic colleagues- those who do
the basic, the pure, the fundamental research, generally reserve
to themselves the right to identify and define problems worthy of
investigation, thus safeguarding the major process of knowledge
production against bids for control by sectional interests, we
educational evaluators can provide a more direct service of
utilitarian nature ; docile to information needs arrived at through
political processes in which we:participate only as other citizens
do. We take care to publish our results of course, and to submit
methods and procedures to the scrutiny of our colleagues. A.nd
we challenge misrepresentations of our firdings from any guarter.
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Finally, in drawing this brief sketch to a close, we might summarise
by saying that in these various ways we help our society to close
the 'gap between the 'haves' and 'have note', to become more like
the society it wants to be, a society of less poverty, less privilege,
more opportunity for every individual to fulfill himself. We sleep
well at nights, and surely deserve to. And so, children, to bed.
Critique of the Portrayal
But the gap between the haves and have !lots continues to nag, like
a bad tooth, especially as we ourselves prosper. Why does it
persist, and what has its persistence to do with our efforts, our
role, our assumptions? Could it be that the rhetoric of government
intent, by which we set so much store, is mere rhetoric, the
persuasive slcganising of a powerless or corrupt political system
held captive by private corporate wealth? There are those who say
so. Like American school of marxist historians of education, led
by Karier, who "start with the assumption that this society is in
fact racist, fundamentally materialistic, and institutionally
structured to protect vested interests." (Karier, 1973) Their
history of education research is a tale of servility to powerful
alliances of economic and political elites. Within such an analysis,
most recently expressed by Bowles and Gintis (1976), education
is a passive instrument of the economy whose main function is to
prepare the labour force for a self-denying role in the maximisation
of profits for the 'haves'. Mind you, critics of the marxist view
are quick to point out that such an assertion needs to be substantiated,
and has not been. O'Keefe (1978) for instance reviewing the Bowles
and Gintis treatise, is scathing: "They do not begin to develop a
sophisticated model of the structure of decisionmaking, with its
immensely complicated network of wealth, income, knowledge, status
and political power." But those of us,and I include myself, who
find the marxist analysis either too reductionist or too depressing
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should note that we to lack a sophisticated model of the decision-
making p7oocess to whioh our work is assumed to relate. Note too
Chat they leAplaill' the gap, while we do not. In any case, even if
we are not the 'white Uncle Toms' so scathingly denounced by Martin
Nicolaus in his unscheduled address to the 1968 Meeting of the
American Sociology Association (Nicolaus, 1969) it is far from easy
to dismiss such accusations by pointing to the social benefits of
our efforts. We need to examine more closely than we have in the
past the political assumptions upon which we rest our case. Perhaps,
in these days of massive •state management and concentration of
capital ownership, we are too complacent about both the capacity
and the will of the liberal democratic state to deliver the good.
sociiFty. And perhaps we need reminding, as Macpherson says, that
democracy is not a mere mechanism of authorisation. " . . . the
egalitarian principle inherent in democracy requires nbt only
'one man, one vote' but also 'one man, öne equally effective right
to live as humanly as he may wish' " (MacPherson, 1973).
Problems of delivery, the delivery of social services that is, could
of course be due to lack - of investment in evaluation, but this
argument is losing what force it once had as social policy evaluation
booms in the western nations. It is big business, getting bigger,
recruiting more and more social scientists to man the feedback loops
of social system managers. In the USA alone more than one thousand
evaluation studies jam the in-trays of federal agencies every year
(Mot, 1976). Since 1969 that country has spent 70 million dollars
a year on educational policy experiments alone, including substantial
allocations to their evaluation (Cohen and Garet, 1975). In Europe
the quantity is more modest, but not the growth curve. The boom
spans the industrial nations. Nobody questions the need for policy
evaluation or underestimates the problem of managing the levelling
up process in the complex 'socio-economic organisations in which we
now live. And evaluation appears to offer a means of harnessing
science to the cause of bringing about a more equitable distribution
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of goods and opportunities through effective policies. The prospect
is one of bringing more rationallty, objectivity, legitimacy and
accountability, as well as more information, into the processes
of policy making.
But already there is enough evidence to suggest quite a serious
flaw in the functioning of this rational model. The flaw lies in
the apparent failure of policymakers to utilise evaluation. Clark
Abt estimates (Abt, 1976) that less than one per cent of evaluation
research reached what he called "the potential pay-off of policy
application". Now Abt was generalising from an overview of the
approximately one thousand evaluation studies of U.S.A. social
action programmes completed each year for the federal bureaucracy,
but there is no compelling reason to believe that the figure would
vary significantly if restricted is the category of educational
evaluations, or that a survey of British or Canadian evaluation
studies would yield a different conclusion. EValuation studies
are not used, at least in ways which are recognisably consonant
with the model of rational decision--making within which they are
typically conceived and carried mt.
Walter Worth (1977), quoting evidence from a recent study (Caplan
et al, 1975) makes the same point, but his analysis of this mal-
function goes beyond Abt's. Whereas Abt calls for a streamlining
of the evaluation processes of production and dissemination,
emphasising what 1 think Worth would call a 'policy-maker constrailat'
theory of non-utilisatioks, Worth himself is more sceptical of the
rational possibilities, seeing policy formation as 'a (political)
process of conflict management and consensus building.' The
researcher who seeks influence, 11 suggests, has to learn the rules
of the bargaining game and work within them. He advocates a political
model of research/evaluation, whi:E. reminding us gently in a final
remark not to lose sight of our comitment to the cause of
rationality.
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`The bargaining game' is an evocative concept, one which we should
keen in mind when we turn, as we now do, to look at some striking
developments in the nature and balance of relationships between
the information-consuming and the information-producing agencies.
Firstly we should note that the growing emphasis on policy research
and evaluation is diverting funds sway from other areas of research
and evaluation, especially basic research. Secondly as the
Norwegian Oren (1976) points out, there has been a shift in
control away from the universities and nearer to the centres of
political power. In Britain, for sxampe, following the Rothschild
report (1971 thefe is more emphasis on customer•contract research
in. which the sponsor, usually the bureaucracy, defines the nature and
sometimes the structure of the problem. Evaluation sponsorship
is increasingly the preserve of government agencies, including
the QUANGO* style agency now favoured as an ad hoc task force to
tackle pressing social problems. Evaluation practice is decreasingly
the preserve of academia as ministries expand their own in-house
capability or, as in the U.S.A., turn to the profit-making evaluation
firms that have sprung up in response to commercial opportunities
generated by the Boom. The European Economic Community also, in
its first major educational policy evaluation, launched this year,
has entrusted the programme to a private company which has university
academics in the nine memberstates under contract to carry out
evaluation under its oversight. Such companies are another form
of QUANGO, dominated by the problems of centralised management and
vulnerable to any loss of patronage.
Meanwhile the private fousdations, conceivably and sometimes professedly
sponsors of non-conformist enquiry, but more vulnerable than ever to
accusations of political meddling, are developing more.collaborative
*Quasi non-governmental organisation
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in a process that is evolving rapidly into a bureaucratic
self--assessment procedure. Even academia, still despite these
trends the main contractor for policy evaluation studies but not
inensitive to the spoor of the beckoning dollar (in the form,
say of eO% overheads in federal grants) yields to no-one in its
docility to managerial values, becoming daily more of an answering
than a questioning service to those who command a nation's resources.
These are worrying trends, I think, not least because they seem to
have received less attention than they merit. Perhaps we should,
in the light of them, feel less than dismayed by the non-utilisation
of evaluation reports, since in aggregation at least such trends
amount to a serious erosion of even the notional safeguards offered
by university-based and University-controlled research. To those
of radical political persuasion of course these trends in Power
relationships amount to no more than a shift in the explicitness
of the means by which policy critique is controlled by power
elites. But even those of us who still pin their faith on facilitating
effective action by legitimate authority must pause before this
increasing concentration of power. Should it continue, we shall
soon be able to say that in no sphere of our social life is the
construction of its nature, significance and options more
centralised than in the activity we have come to call 'policy'
or 'programme' evaluation.
And here's the rub. There is no policy evaluatiowl, despite the
popularity of this nomenclature and the vast sums invested in its
name. What we have by and large is evaluation of the effects of
policy upon these who are declared to be its intended beneficiaries.
We evaluate the instruments of policy, the programmes of social
action which emanate from agency offices. Often our enquiries are
*,,lore narrowly f:calised, searching only fo:: those effects
which tell us whether programmes have or have not achieved their
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stated goals, ignoring effects which are not goal-related. What
we seldom contemplate, and even more rarely achieve with any degree
of penetraiou, is the evaluation of the origins or processes
of policy formulation. There is more than a grain of truth in
Nioolaus's condemnation of the social scientist as a man with
'palms upward, eyes downward s (Nicolaus, op. cit.) We evaluate
the managed, not the managers, the objects of policy and not the
makers, the have mots' not the 'haves'. With of course the best
of intentions, as we already explained to the children. But good
intentions are not enough. Maybe the time has come for us to
look up as well as down, to raise our political horizons.
Looking up for a change
This will not be easy. As Pondy (1977) remarks gA program evaluation
strategy that could potentially' conclude that agency funds could have
been better spent on seine other program is not likely to survive
selection procedures." To go further one could say that an
evaluation perspective which implicitly defines the policymaking
process as a choice among alternatives will have even greater
difficulty in gaining acceptance. But nothing less is needed now.
Political meddling? Of cours. Evaluation is an inescapably
political activity. But it can and should in my view remain a
political service. The issue is at what level of political
instrumentality we should define our role. There is now a. general
consensus of right and left in politics that contemporary concentra-
tions of power constitute a threat to the feasibility of the
liberal-democratic state, ane a growing sense of reduced
responsiveness on the part of the powerful to the needs of the
powerless, the poor, the disadvantaged. In such circumstances
there is an urgent need for us to re-eamine our contract, to use what
bargaining power we can muster to raise our sights.
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Ono alternative reaction to the probe n iF 	 'pax
investigation, as Becker has done:
"To have values or not to have values:
the question .is always with us when sociologists undertake
to study problems that have relevance to the world we live
in .
But the dilemma does not ,exist since it is not possible to
do research that is uncontaminated by personal and
political sympathies .
The question is not whether we should take sides, but
rather whose side a.5:e we on?"
(Beeker, 1967)
This is more or less what Nicolaus endorses when he advises young
radicals to take the agency money and subvert the system. I em
not yet ready to abandon the ideal of evaluation as a disinterested
service to demcratic societies. The options are not limited to
a choice betwen strengthening or subverting existing power
relationships, although the history of evaluation might indicate
otherwise. I said earlier that the radical critics had failed
to substantiate their thesis about the relationship between
education and the economy, and pointed out that the same could be
said of those ef us who reject the thesis. This suggests one obvious
point of denarture for a new political direction in evaluation. We
can only escape the options of consolidating or subverting the status
quo by enlarging our definitions .):E what is to be evaluated. If
evaluation is concerned. as I think most of us would agree with
choice between alternativP action, it should be concerned not
just with choice4 within given programmes (formative evaluation)
nor choices betucen prograames (sumnative evaluation) but with
Choices between r. iicies and choico.; between policy-making processes
(and this I woul call a defensible form of political evaluation).
We can at least begin by raising ouz present sights until they
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ncompss tho processes of pc\licy-making that relate to the
formulation of the particular programmes we contract to study.
in thl7 way wc, 	 h:g.n to contribute to the construction of a
descriptive model of the decision-making process whose structure,
functioning and adequacy for the purposes and intents of a democratic
society we have larogly taken for granted. "We evaluation
msthodologists," say5 Campbell, are in fact designing alternative
political systems," (Campbell, 1977) I think he has the facts
wrong. Our relationship to the political system has consistently
functioned. within constraints imposed by powerful interest groups
Within our varying democracies. The trends in evaluation sponsorship
and control to which I have drawn attention in this paper suggest
a strengthening rather than a weakening Of thebe constraints.
There is however still, in my view, sufficient fluidity and
uncertainty in the situation to suggest that we could begin to
reverse these trends, and to achieve for evaluation a degree of
independence that would enable us to provide, for all the actors
in our societies, a disinterested source of information about the
origins, processes and effects of social action. This involves
us in challenging monopolies of various kinds - of problem definition,
of issue formulation, of data control, of information utilisation.
We are not just in the business of helping some people to make
educational choices within their present responsibilities and
opportunities. We are also in the business of helping all
our peoples to choose between alternative gocieties.
What hope is: there that such a concept of the evaluator's role
could ever gain acceptance, or any purchase within systems of power
relationships whose durability is well attested? Not much perhaps,
but we can take some strength and some hope from those theorists
of democracy, like Macpherson, who think that the liberal-demo state
is reaching a point where it really will lave to make good its rhetoric
of intent. "1 am arguing that we are reaching a level of productivity
at which the maximisation of human powers in the descriptive sense
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can take over as the criterion of the good society, and that in
the present world climate it will have to be an egalitarian maximi-
sation of powers. . 	 . The West will, I think, be reduced to
competing morally. It will, that is to say, have to compete in
the quality of life it makes possible for its citizens 	 . .
The competition is not between West and East for the favour of any
third party; it is between the leaders, the holders of political
power, in both East and West, for the support of their own
people." (Macpherson, op. cit.)
If Macpherson is right, there may in the near future be more
bargaining power than we now assume. There may even be more now.
If so it could provide us with opportunities to make a more
effective contribution than we so far have to reducing the gap
in all our societies between those who have and those.who have not.
This is not to take sides; it is to take seriously, rather than
for granted, the public rhetoric of the liberal democratic state.
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